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1. Introduction1 
 
 
Although there are different notions of what legal norms sets apart from social norms, all 
concepts of law adhere to the principle of legal equality, according to which like cases are 
treated alike. Law thus requires that like cases are treated in a like manner. This, in turn, 
requires a high compliance rate with any given regulation. Without sufficient compliance 
rates, it is hardly possible to speak of law.  
 
But can a high degree of compliance be realized beyond the coercive capacities of the 
nation-state? The sceptical formulation of Herbert Kelsen (1966: 4) is famous: "The 
antagonism of freedom and coercion fundamental to social life supplies the decisive criterion. 
It is the criterion of law, for law is a coercive order." This point of view is also reflected in 
Realism as a theory of international relations (Morgenthau 1964, Waltz 1979). For Realism, 
legal constraints beyond the nation-state are non-existent or, at best, very weak (e.g. 
Krasner 1999 on human rights). Furthermore, communitarianists point out that questions of 
law and justice can meaningfully be dealt with only in communities that share common 
values and ideas (Goodin 1988, Miller 1995) and are equally doubtful about the possibility for 
law beyond the nation-state. In this sense, it seems fair to describe the question of 
compliance as the Achilles' heel of international regulations (see Werksmann 1996: xvi, 
Young 1999a: Chap. 4). 
 
This paper aims to shed doubt on the scepticism of Realism and Communitarianism. As 
opposed to the propositions of both theoretical strands we show that law beyond the nation-
state is indeed possible and that compliance can even in a horizontal setting without 
centralized coercive capacities and without a single underlying social identity work sufficiently 
well. We furthermore show some of the building blocks of a successful elicitation of 
compliance beyond the nation-state and discuss if and in how far the EU is different from 
other international institutions in realising them. For developing this argument we start by 
introducing our research design and case selection (section 2). Section 3 introduces our 
empirical results, discusses their relevance for the analysis of compliance and draws some 
theoretical implications. This section is followed by a discussion of the relevance of the 
results for the study of European integration (section 4).  
 
 
 
                                                          
1 This paper presents some findings from the research project on "Compliance in Modern Political 
Systems", sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. Besides the authors, Christian 
Joerges and Dieter Wolf participated in this project. Although the authors are solely responsible for 
any shortcomings of this paper, it is based largely on these common efforts. We therefore owe 
many thanks to Christian Joerges and Dieter Wolf for advice and cooperation. The paper was first 
presented at the conference “Verfassungspolitik in der Europäischen Union” in Mannheim. 
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2. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
On Compliance 
Compliance needs to be distinguished from the concepts of implementation and 
effectiveness: As opposed to the latter two concepts, compliance neither focuses on the 
efforts to administer authoritative public policy directives and the changes of these policy 
contents during this administrative process (implementation)2 nor on the efficacy of a given 
regulation in solving the political problem, which preceded its formulation (effectiveness).3 
Compliance research is primarily concerned with the degree to which addressees of a rule 
"adhere to the provision of the accord and to the implementing measures that they have 
instituted" (Jacobsen/Weiss 1998: 4).4 Perfect compliance, imperfect implementation and 
zero effectiveness therefore are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Because compliance 
with commitments is a necessary condition for effective governance, however, compliance 
and effectiveness are nevertheless closely related to one another.  
 
Any assessment of compliance starts with the identification of a rule. Without a rule entailing 
clear pre- or proscriptions, (non-)compliance is difficult to assess. In identifying such rules, 
the project abstains from analyzing implicit or tacit norms, which are not clearly codified 
and/or lack a more than marginal consent concerning their precise content. Such general 
rules are, for example, ”reciprocity” (Keohane 1986), ”fairness” (Franck 1995) or ”justice” 
(Gibson 1989). Although these norms are by no means unimportant for the achievement of 
collective well-being, they have too little intersubjective precision for defining a point of 
reference to assess compliance. Some would even argue that sufficient precision of a rule is 
a defining element of legal rules (Goldstein et al. 2000). 
 
Even if rules are specific and clearly formulated, however, the assessment of the 
discrepancy between text and action is no easy undertaking. The intrinsic ambiguity of law 
always necessitates acts of application and interpretation. As a ”living being”, law is not 
constant over time, but subject to changing interpretations of its meaning and to new case 
law which interprets and changes the meaning of statutory law (Dworkin 1986). Any 
assessment of compliance therefore must be carefully weighed and take into account all 
available pros and cons and as much as possible sources of an addressees actions. 
Assessing compliance is furthermore complicated by the fact that it does not only refer to a 
difference between pre- or proscriptions and actions, but is also subject to institutional 
treatment and may change over time. We use four categories of (non-)compliance for 
integrating this procedural dimension: Rule-related actions of addressees will be categorized 
as 
 
(1) ”compliance” if the difference between the pre- and proscriptions of a norm and an 
addressees behaviour is null or negligible and addressees do not publicly voice their 
discomfort with a rule; 
(2) ”recalcitrant compliance” if the difference between the pre- and proscriptions of a norm 
and an addressees behaviour is null or negligible but addressees publicly voice their 
                                                          
2  Cf. the research by Victor/Raustiala/Skolnikoff (1998), Mayntz (1980) and Siedentopf/Ziller (1988). 
3  Cf. Haas/Keohane/Levy (1993), Miles/Underdal (2001) and Young (1999b). 
4  Further research in this tradition can be found in Cameron/Werksman/Roderick (1996) and 
Chayes/Chayes (1995). 
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discomfort with a rule; 
(3) ”initial non-compliance” if we observe both a significant difference between the pre- and 
proscriptions of a norm and an addressees behaviour, and a change in behavior of the 
addressee due to allegations and/or a decision of an authorized dispute settlement body 
or court;  
(4) ”iterated non-compliance” if we observe both a significant difference between the pre- 
and proscriptions of a norm and an addressees behaviour, and no change in behavior of 
the addressee although the practice has been detected, alleged and/or outruled by a 
decision of an authorized dispute settlement body or court.  
 
 
Case Selection 
The project analyses compliance in a comparative perspective which sets European 
regulations in context to similar regulations in institutional settings on the national and the 
international level. A major challenge in designing this project has been to identify 
comparable cases from three different issue areas across three levels of political decision-
making. The selection of issue areas is based on the distinction between policies termed by 
Lowi (1972) as constitutive (market-making), regulative (market-correcting) and (re-
)distributive (market-braking),5 each of them taking place at different levels. This ideal set of 
cases has been modified over time. We ended up with three sets of comparison. 
 
• Our analysis of market-making policies focuses on subsidy controls and covers all three 
levels. At the national level, we looked into compliance with the regulation for preventing 
subsidized competition between federal states in Germany. This is chiefly based on two 
so-called subsidization codes issued by the economic ministers of the German states 
(Länder). The corresponding regulation at the European level is the European 
Commission Subsidy Control as laid down in Arts. 87-89 of the Consolidated Version of 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (ex-Arts. 92-94) and the agreements 
regarding secondary law-making based on these Articles. Finally, for international 
subsidy control, the investigation includes Article XVI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) together with the agreement on the interpretation and the 
application of Article XVI, known as the "Subsidization Code" (GATT/26S/56). The 
international regulation was strengthened in 1994 by a separate agreement on 
subsidies. 
• The two cases chosen for analyzing compliance with regulative policies focus on trade in 
foodstuffs. Both the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
have developed exemption rules from the principle of non-discrimination and free trade 
that allow import restrictions imposed to protect human health and life as long as they 
cannot be considered an arbitrary discrimination or a disguised obstruction of trade 
among member states. Both of these regulations came at different occasions under 
severe pressure. Regarding foodstuffs, the EC Commission’s decision in 1999 to end 
the embargo on British beef and a decision of the Appellate Body of the WTO in 1998, 
declaring an EC ban on five growth hormones to be incompatible with WTO law, are 
especially telling. In both cases, a highly elaborate institutional design and a decision 
that is widely perceived as meeting the criteria of valid law, met with open non-
compliance on the part of its addressees.  
                                                          
5 See also Streeck (1998) for this distinction. 
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• The redistribution of financial resources between territorially defined political units is the 
object of our last comparison. Both the intergovernmental system of the German 
Bundesländer and that of the EC have developed a similar parallelism of market-making 
and redistributive market-correcting mechanisms. In both systems, redistribution is of 
constitutional importance and is explicitly codified as being an essential element of 
political order. Its realization, however, is in both cases the product of intergovernmental 
bargaining, and therefore heavily influenced by a variety of political concerns. Not only 
the legal principles and the political practice, but also the intensity of redistribution is 
quite comparable at both levels. Both mechanisms redistribute a similar amount of 
resources among a similar number of states.  
 
This choice of cases is geared to react to recent objections against findings of remarkable 
compliance which have argued that the type and depth of the regulation in question are 
important factors for an institution‘s capacity to deal with compliance issues (see Underdal 
2001, Downs et al. 1996, Raustiala and Victor 1998: 662). The regulations that we compare 
across levels are constant on both of these counts. They are very similar in content and type, 
and thus also in their underlying interest constellation. Moreover, they are, in general, very 
similar with regard to depth. For instance, the relative amount of money transferred in the 
German Länderfinanzausgleich is remarkably similar to the redistributive mechanism of the 
EU. The major net recipient of EU redistribution via EFRE Structural Funds and Cohesion 
Fund is Portugal with a net gain of 2,93% of GDP per year; the major recipient in the German 
Länderfinanzausgleich − Berlin − receives almost exactly the same relative amount, that is 
2,89% of GDP per year. Though less quantifiable, it is agreed that European subsidy 
regulations are at least as "deep" as the agreement within the FRG, and the depth of 
intervention in the hormone case at the international level is similar to that of the BSE case at 
the European level.  
 
 
 
3. Compliance and its Conditions 
 
 
The most striking result of our cases is that in each set of comparisons the rates of 
compliance with EU regulations are better or at least as good as compliance with regulations 
at other levels.6 As to subsidy control, the German regulation among the Laender is hardly 
complied with at all. Each of the Laender acts as it pleases and no coordinated effort at 
strengthening compliance can be observed. Compliance with WTO rules seem to be slightly 
better, but is likewise far from good. In the EU, however, subsidy control can be viewed a a 
major example of the EU’s capacity to discipline member states and has an impressive 
record of curbing member states subisidies. While the overall level of subsidies did further 
grow after the regulation among the Laender were agreed upon, this level decreased 
significantly after EU regulations were set (see Wolf 2001).  
 
 
                                                          
6 For reasons of the limited space of this article we do not elaborate extensively on the three 
comparisons, but focues on the major findings. For more extensive accounts on subisides and 
relevant literature cf. Wolf (2001), on redistributive policy cf. Neyer (2001a) and on trade policy cf. 
Neyer (2001b).  
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The EU’s record in eliciting compliance with trade rules is likewise impressive. Although its 
treatment of the recent BSE case also showed its vulnerability to political pressure, the EU is 
still far better at securing the rule of law than does the WTO. While compliance with 
European trade regulation is realized in most cases routinely and in disputed cases at least 
as the product of legal procedures, the WTO’s record shows a number of cases of open non-
compliance. The comparison of the BSE case with the hormone beef case is telling.  
 
Even in the redistributive case, the EU shows a remarkabe capacity of eliciting compliance. 
Although the amount of resources to be distributed from the richer to the poorer member 
states is a matter of intense political bargaining, as the moves of the German government in 
early 2000 have clearly indicated, no member state has so far threatened to contribute its 
share or even openly rejected its financial obligation. In the German case, however, both 
Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg openly threatened to put into question the sovereignty of 
poorer German Laender if they would not accept limited redistributions. These German 
Laender complied only recalcitrantly.  
 
 
Table 1: Relatively Assessed Compliance Records 
 
Subsidies EU>WTO≥FRG 
Foodstuffs EU>WTO 
Redistributional Mechanisms EU≥FRG 
 
 
In all three set of comparisons, the EU fares very well. Such a favorable finding for the EU is 
quite astonishing. It squarely contradicts the hypothesis that regulations that have been 
developed and established within a national setting do systematically show a better 
compliance record than similar regulations in other political settings.  
 
Against the background of our findings, recently voiced concerns about the limited capacity 
of the EU to deal with compliance issues (Knill/Lenschow 1999, Tallberg 2000: 19) may be 
helpful for underlining that compliance in the EU is by no means self-enforcing but is often 
subject to political dispute or even open confrontation between the Commission and a 
member government. The insights provided by such studies, however, need to be put in 
perspective and take into account  
 
• that compliance is often only a matter of time and improves as a product of political 
interaction between the Commission and the member states (cf. Neyer/Wolf 2001), and, 
even more generally,  
• that high numbers on the amount of activities of monitoring and adjudicating bodies must 
also be interpreted as an indicator for a well functioning compliance enforcement system 
(Keohane et al. 2000: 474-475). Many of the figures provided as indications of 
compliance problems in the EU may therefore be seen as an indication of a well working 
compliance system.  
 
The most important reason for not overestimating the compliance problems of the EU is, 
however, one that puts the EU in perspective. Ours is a relative argument. The EU is more 
  
   8 
effective in eliciting compliance than other settings when similar policies are compared. 
Although it is certainly true that all modern political systems face compliance problems, these 
difficulties may vary systematically between different institutional contexts. According to our 
findings, the EU is a most successful case, and one to learn from. 
 
 
3.1 Determinants and Dynamics of Compliance Beyond the Nation-State 
 
How to explain this striking evidence? And how to acount for the variance in compliance over 
our set of cases? At least four theoretical perspectives for the explanation of compliance can 
be found in the literature. Following common usage, we label the four theoretical 
perspectives on compliance "rational institutionalism", "legalization", "legitimacy" and 
"reflexivity" respectively.7 These four perspectives are not so much clear-cut theories of 
compliance, but rather point to a set of perspectives as well as a set of processes and 
variables that help to understand compliance issues. Each of the four theoretical 
perspectives are problem-driven attempts at theorizing with a grounding in compliance 
issues, drawing from and combining processes and factors emphasized by different theories 
and disciplines. In confronting the theoretical perspectives with the evidence from our cases, 
we do not aim at testing them thoroughly but to show that the relationship among the 
variables highlighted by the different perspectives is interactive and dynamic.  
 
 
3.1.1 Rational Institutionalism 
 
Rational Institutionalism especially highlights two determinants of successful compliance: 
effective monitoring and the institutionalization of enforcement so that the risks and costs are 
minimized for the complaining party.8 Subsidy control and trade in foodstuffs demonstrate 
particularly well that these are indeed important aspects of successful compliance beyond 
the nation-state.9 In compliance with subsidy controls the EU fares better than the WTO, 
which in turn does better than Germany. In eliciting compliance with trade in foodstuffs, the 
EU seems to be slightly more successful than the WTO. Rational Institutionalism thus 
expects monitoring and the institutionalization of horizontal enforcement to be most effective 
within the EU setting and least effective in Germany, with the WTO lying in-between. Our 
evidence supports this hypothesis.  
 
 
                                                          
7 For other categorizations of approaches explaining compliance see, among others, Haas (1998), 
Hurd (1999), Jacobsen/Weiss (1998), Underdal (1998). 
8 Important contributions along the lines of rational institutionalism are Mitchell (1994), 
Weiss/Jacobson (1998) and Tallberg (1999). 
9 With regard to redistributional regulations, monitoring seems to be no institutional problem. The 
receiver of resources notices immediately when he does not receive them. Moreover, sanctioning 
someone who is not willing to help oneself looks odd. For these reasons we shall not discuss this 
set of comparisons in terms of Rational Institutionalism.  
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Monitoring 
The European Commission has many functions, and monitoring the conformity of member 
states with EU rules is certainly among its most prominent activities. On the one hand, the 
Commission itself invests a great deal of resources in systematically collecting and 
assessing information on compliance with EU rules. On the spot checks of national 
administrations and companies, and the demanding and processing of information on the 
application of EU law are most important instruments. On the other hand, the Commission 
also cooperates closely with firms, interest groups, consumer groups and national 
administrations to record and examine complaints about non-compliance. In this way, the 
Commission multiplies its resources devoted to monitoring. Especially the efforts of the 
Commission to fight illegal subsidies benefit crucially from the integration of societal actors. 
Companies generally have a strong interest that their competitors do not receive illegitimately 
resources which offset the market mechanism and, probably more important, put themselves 
at a disadvantage. Therefore, they may be seen as most important allies of the Commission 
in eliciting compliance with EU anti-subsidies law (cf. Tallberg 2000: 28). Equally important is 
the requirement for the member states to notify all relevant legislation to the Commission 
before they are domestically enacted. This provision leaves the Commission the option to 
outrule any measure which endangers the integrity of the European legal system. All these 
activities take place before the Commission files an infringement procedure.  
 
As opposed to the EU, the WTO mainly depends on decentralized, intergovernmental 
monitoring. The WTO procedures encourage governments who suspect other governments 
of violating the WTO rules to report their suspicion to the WTO. This type of monitoring, in 
combination with a centralized dispute settlement procedure, seems effective as long as 
border-issues in trade relations are concerned. Exporters can be expected to realize quickly 
when border-tariffs and regulations increase. Now that the WTO also deals with behind-the-
border-issues (see Kahler 1995), the development of more independent, centralized 
monitoring mechanisms which are open to complaints by companies appear to be 
necessary. While the WTO has by now developed some monitoring capacities (e.g. the 
Trade Policy Review Body), they are explicitly without legal consequence, rely on the 
goodwill of the Contracting Parties and are somewhat deficient when compared to the EU. 
Things look much different, however, when the WTO procedures in subsidies control are 
compared to the procedures of the FRG. In the German subsidy control case, finally, there is 
no institutionalized monitoring between the German Länder at all. Monitoring and the 
formulation of complaints against the actions taken by other Länder relies solely on unilateral 
action on the part of one Land with the effect that it basically does either not occur or, if it 
happens at all, does not enter the stage of legal dispute settlement. No surprise from this 
perspective that compliance with the German Laender regulations is so weak. 
 
 
Sanctioning 
Both the EU and the WTO have set up sanctioning systems that involve less costs for the 
complaining party than would be the case in a purely anarchical setting. Until 1993, the EU 
had no sanctioning mechanism at all. If states disregarded judgements of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ), all the Commission could do was to start a renewed infringement 
procedure. Nor were states permitted to sanction each other. Only the Maastricht Treaty 
provided the Commission with the possibility to impose a lump sum or penalty payment on 
  
   10 
those member states who disregarded ECJ judgements. So far, the Commission has solely 
relied on daily penalty payments and not used lump sums. In any case, member states do 
not carry the costs of sanctioning the violators.  
 
In the WTO, the picture is rather mixed. On the one hand one may point out that Contracting 
Parties can rely on a dispute settlement mechanism which acts as a third party and 
autonomously decides on matters of legality and sanctioning. On the other hand however, it 
must be added that plaintiffs must be aware that complaints against any other Contracting 
Party may lead to legal retaliation and set off a chain-reaction of counter claims. Busch and 
Reinhardt (2000: 10) report that the average complaint increases the probability that the 
target of a complaint will file a retaliatory suit within one year by 55 times. Furthermore, 
because any authorization to enact the suspension of trade concessions is always limited to 
an amount which offsets the damage that has occurred to a plaintiff, Contracting Parties are 
factually free to chose between compliance and accepting the limited consequences of non-
compliance. In this sense, the WTO has institutionalized a tit-for-tat mechanism which has 
neither a deterrent nor a punishing effect and is not without risk for the plaintiff. To the 
German Laender, even such limited sanctioning mechanisms are unavailable in the two 
cases we looked at. In subsidies policy, no sanctioning mechanisms whatsoever are 
foreseen and the only way for a Land to react to excessive subsidy payments by any other 
Land is to do the same. The sanctioning of a violator therefore creates substantial second-
order costs for the sanctioning party.  
 
The compliance patterns observed in the case studies matches the expectations of Rational 
Institutionalism.10 Where monitoring and sanctioning functions are supported by centralized 
institutions that make full use of transnational non-governmental actors, as in the EU, 
compliance works best. Where monitoring and sanctioning remains an intergovernmental 
function, as in the WTO, compliance works reasonably well. Where all the second-order 
costs in monitoring and sanctioning must be borne by the complaining party, as in the case 
of the FRG, there is little compliance. 
 
 
3.1.2 Legalization 
 
Legalistic approaches see ambiguities and inconsistencies in rule setting and application as 
the major sources of non-compliance. 11 The solution is a process of legalization, so that the 
regulation in question becomes incorporated as deeply as possible into existing rule of law 
systems. Moreover, the degree of "preciseness" of norms and the need for the existence of 
so-called secondary rules that help in settling disputes about the content and the application 
                                                          
10 With regard to redistributional regulations, monitoring seems to be no institutional problem. The 
receiver of resources notices immediately when he does not receive them. Moreover, sanctioning 
someone who is not willing to help oneself looks odd. For these reasons we shall not discuss this 
set of comparisons in terms of Rational Institutionalism. However, if one did, it would appear vital 
that monitoring costs and room for institutionalized sanctioning do not vary across the different 
levels, since they are largely determined by properties of the policy itself. Rational Institutionalism 
would therefore expect there to be no notable difference in terms of compliance across different 
political settings. This conclusion is clearly compatible with the findings of the study on re-
distributional regulations. 
11 Highly stimulationg legalistic contributions are Koh (1997) and Raustiala (1995). Cf. also Keohane 
et al. (2000). 
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of the norms themselves is stressed.12 It follows that the more a rule is considered part of a 
legal system, or, put differently: the more an international institution is legalized, the more 
likely compliance with the rule becomes. In this sense, legal rules possess a compliance pull 
of their own (Franck 1990). 
 
For analysing legalization, we will in the following distinguish between the degree of 
legalization of a polity (such as the WTO, the EU or the FRG) and the degree of legalization 
of specific policies (such as subisidy policy or foodstuffs policy). While the former refers to 
the overall legal design of a polity and addresses questions such as the Kompetenz-
Kompetenz or the status of individuals as legal subjects in a given political order, the latter 
refers to the concrete expression such overall designs have in specific policies. We 
furthermore distinguish among two elements which legalization comprises: juridification and 
internalization (cf. Zürn/Wolf 1999). Juridification refers to a process in which the settling of 
disputes over the application of regulations is delegated to a third party. The greater the 
independence of the members of the adjudication body, e.g. measured in terms of selection 
method and tenure (see Keohane et al. 2000: 461), and the more the members of these 
bodies apply legal reasoning (instead of bargaining), the higher the degree of juridification.  
 
In terms of juridification of the polity, the ranking of our cases is straightforward. The ECJ has 
a high level of independence with a very long tenure of the judges and a sophisticated level 
of legal reasoning. Likewise, the German Constitutional Court (GCC) is of undisputed 
independence and a clear example of a highly juridified dispute settlement body. The new 
WTO follows somewhat behind on these two counts. As opposed to the old dispute 
settlement mechanism of the GATT, its new Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is a highly 
independent and juridified mechanism, but still less autonomous than the ECJ.  
 
When it comes to assessing juridification in a policy perspective, however, an important 
distinction must be made between the formal design of dispute settlement mechanisms and 
their factual competence to decide in specific cases: Although the GCC for example was 
over and over asked by plaintiff Länder to give an opinion on the constitutionality of the level 
of redistribution, it repeatedly argued that any such question was of a political nature and 
therefore beyond the scope of its competence. Likewise, the ECJ has no competence to 
decide on the level of redistribution realized in the EU but is – same as the GCC – limited to 
assessing whether member states fulfill their legal obligations. In the federal subsidies case 
too, the formally high degree of legalization did not translate into a policy-specific high 
degree of legalization due to the hesitancy of the Länder to use that option for fear of a 
resulting process of centralization. It is only in the European subsidies case and in the two 
foodstuffs cases, therefore, where a formal competence not only exists but also was factually 
executed and had an observable impact on the behavior of addressees.  
 
The element of internalization is subdivided into legal and civil internalization. Legal 
internalization means here that inter- or supranational legal norms are accepted by national 
courts without national governments having the chance to veto them. In this way law beyond 
the nation-state is enforced by domestic courts. Civilly internalized means that those affected 
by the regulations have actionable civil rights, or to put it differently, access to inter- or 
                                                          
12 The major work on this view is H. L. A. Hart’s Concept of Law (1972). The classic formulation of 
Oliver Holmes’s (1897) legal realism, "Law is what courts do", should also be noted.  
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supranational courts (cf. Koh 1997). Again, legal internalization is furthest developed in the 
EU and in Germany. The supremacy of European law over national law and the direct effect 
of ECJ case law through the preliminary-ruling procedure of Article 234 (ex-Art. 177) 
guarantees European regulations (and some directives) in the subsidies case and the 
foodstuffs case unquestionable legal validity in all member states. Likewise, the GCC claims 
a never challenged legal supremacy over all other national Courts and all actions taken by 
governmental authorities. Compared to the ECJ and the GCC, the DSB of the WTO lags 
behind in terms of legal internalization. Its rulings are neither accepted by the ECJ nor by 
domestic courts to constitute legal obligations. Although highly juridified, it therefore fares 
less well in terms of legal internalization. 
 
In sharp contrast to the widely held conviction of a European administration, disentangled 
from its citizens, civil internalization is rather well developed on the European level and can 
almost compare with the national level. Although it may take years for a suit filed by an 
individual to follow all the way through the different national courts up to the ECJ (cf. Joerges 
2001), it is at least possible for non-state actors to use European law for challenging a 
member state governmental action. To the contrary, the WTO shows no elements of civil 
internalization whatsoever. All legal actions must be initiated by the governments themselves 
who are the only actors who are granted legal standing. The settling of disputes therefore 
remains an undertaking which is heavily influenced by political considerations, 
intergovernmental bargaining. 
 
These differences are reflected on the level of specific policies. In the subsidies and the 
foodstuffs case, individuals not only have a better access to dispute settlement bodies (via 
the Commission) than at the international level but also (in the subsidies case) as compared 
to the national level. Due to the purely intergovernmental character of federal subsidies 
policy, the formally high degree of juridification and legal internalization in the FRG could 
have no effect on the actual compliance record. Likewise, in the BSE case any affected 
citizen could have filed a legal suit against the actions taken by the German government and 
force the German government to comply with its obligations. Although it is true that civil 
internalization in redistributive policy is very low on the European level, the same applies to 
the German mechanism. Due to the German legal tradition that legal claims by individuals 
must prove a significant damage that has occurred to them (prohibition of a Popularklage), 
no individual claim against non-compliance of a Land with the provisions of the redistributive 
mechanism would have any chance to withstand legal scrutiny.  
 
In sum, the compliance records observed in the case studies support the conjectures derived 
from the theoretical perspective of legalization, emphasizing juridification and internalization. 
In at least two of the three comparisons, it is the level with the higher degree of legalization 
which elicits the comparatively higher degree of compliance. The importance of legalization 
becomes especially clear in the comparison on subsidy controls but can also be observed in 
foodstuffs policy. In both cases, it is the comparatively highly developed legal mechanisms of 
the EU which account for much of the variance, whereas the comparatively lower legalization 
of the WTO shows serious functional deficiencies to cope with alleged cases of non-
compliance. Moreover, the similarity in compliance regarding the redistributional cases 
reflects a parallel level of legalization in this policy area in the FRG and the EU. However, 
any unconditional optimism towards the functional effectiveness of law as a steering 
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mechanism for the pursuit of political order must take into account that compliance enforced 
by courts is a highly time consuming business which carries no guarantee of success. The 
limits of law as a steering mechanism are not only underlined by the failure of the WTO’s 
DSB to make the EU comply with its decision on hormones but also by cases like the Alcan 
case (cf. Wolf 2001) in which it took 17 years to recover illegal subsidies, or the BSE case in 
which only a political compromise could put an end to the dispute. Any assessment of the 
independent power of the law therefore is well advised to take into account that its 
effectiveness presupposes its embeddedness in an institutional setting which follows the 
logic of Rational Institutionalism. We can thus point to a first interactive effect: the logic of 
Rational Institutionalism and the logic of legalization does support each other.  
 
 
3.1.3 Legitimacy  
 
Approaches to compliance which focus on questions of legitimacy are highly difficult to 
categorize, even more so to operationalize. Whilst some focus on a rule’s material fairness 
and therefore on the outcome of a political process (Franck 1995), others concentrate on the 
procedures that have led to adopting a rule (Habermas 1992). For taking both elements on 
board, we follow the distinction between input- and output-legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). The 
former asks for the degree to which the procedures used in the making of a rule were in 
accordance with basic principles of good governance. Although there is no consensus in the 
literature about the substantial content of these principles, most authors would agree that the 
participation of addressees and affected parties is of crucial importance both inside as well 
as beyond the nation-state. Only if those who are expected to comply with a rule had a say in 
the making of the rule, a rule will be accepted as legitimate. Output-legitimacy focuses on the 
response that the pre- and/or proscriptions of a rule receive from its domestic affected 
parties. Output-legitimacy therefore asks whether a rule is viewed by its affected parties as 
adequate, just or fair, independent of the procedures that were used in its making.  
 
The explanatory power of both variables, however, is rather mixed. On the one hand, there is 
only weak empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that all the addressees of a 
regulation must have a fair chance of co-determination of the formulation of the rules, as this 
was to a large extent given in almost all the cases we examined. One could even argue that 
the case with the lowest degree of inclusion of addressees and affected parties and with the 
broadest discretionary powers on the part of a third actor (European subsidies policy) shows 
an extraordinary high degree of compliance, while in the case of federal subsidies policy it 
was exactly the strong position of the Länder in the application of the rules which prohibited 
their effectiveness. On the other hand, however, the foodstuffs cases provide evidence for 
exactly the opposite finding: In the two foodstuffs cases it was essentially the disrespect of 
the authors of the respective rule (the Codex Alimenarius Commission in the hormones case 
and the European Commission in the BSE case) for the concerns of major addressees and 
affected parties which arouse their protest and led to open non-compliance. Neither the EU 
in the hormones case nor France and Germany in the BSE case were ready to accept the 
outcome of a narrow vote which refused to accept their concerns as being legitimate. 
Although the procedures according to which the decisions were taken could build on 
consented procedures, their outcome equaled a factual exclusion of concerns which the 
defeated parties viewed as being of utmost importance to them.  
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These two seemingly contradictory findings may be brought together, however, if we qualify 
the legitimacy hypothesis by setting it in context to the democratic character of the 
addressees of rules: in this perspective, democratic governments carry an inescapable 
responsibility for promoting those views which are domestically being viewed by a large 
majority as highly sensitive. Any refusal to take those concerns seriously would amount to a 
disrespect of domestic democratic procedures and have little chance to withstand public 
protest. Following this line of reasoning, a most basic difference between the subsidies and 
the foodstuffs cases is that the former can rely on a broad public acceptance of the necessity 
to limit governmental spending and arouses in case of enforcement only the protest of 
narrow interests (the affected company plus affected employees). The safety of foodstuffs, 
however, is of concern to far broader public circles and can build on unequivocal support for 
as stringent regulations as possible and a clear emphasis on the precautionary principle. It is 
therefore entirely plausible to assume that the satisfactory participation of all addresses of a 
regulation in the decision-making process is at least in cases of broad public concern a 
necessary, but by no means the sufficient requirement for good compliance rates.  
 
Against this background, the relatively successful overall compliance rates of the EU as 
compared to the WTO may not the least be borne by the systematic integration of the targets 
of a regulation into the decision-making processes of the EU. No other political institution 
beyond the nation-state has developed such far-reaching procedures for involving non-state 
targets of regulation in the will-formation and decision-making processes. By the mid-1990s, 
693 formal EU-level interest groups had been established and 3000 interest associations 
from every country and every conceivable sector had an office in Brussels 
(Aspinwell/Greenwood 1998: 3). Such openness to interest groups, that are frequently the 
targets of a regulation, distinguishes the EU. No such developments can be observed in 
connection with the WTO, even less so, of course, with the GATT. The more decisive 
argument, however, in our view relates to the social acceptance of a regulation by the broad, 
general public, which in the course of our studies emerged as the real weak point of 
compliance in horizontal settings. Even stable institutions built under the guidance of 
Rational Institutionalism and, furthermore, legally internalized, reach the limit of their capacity 
to bring about compliance if national publics refuse to associate themselves with the 
substantial demands of a regulation.  
 
The decisive point is the following: If the content of a regulation (i) moves from the agenda of 
sectoral publics onto the agenda of different broad national publics, (ii) becomes fragmented, 
i.e. is discussed without reference to the other national debates, and (iii) opposing opinions 
of the regulation are formed, then substantial compliance problems are likely to arise. The 
power of such "public disturbances", which are due to the desire of governments to be re-
elected will even prevail if the regulation has previously been under deliberative negotiation 
among transnational sectoral publics. Seen in this, a second interactive effect among our 
explanatory variables becomes evident. Legitimacy only becomes important when rationally 
designed institutions and legalization have created a strong compliance system. Then, the 
power of the courts will be countered from time to time by the power of the people.  
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3.1.4 Management 
 
This theoretical perspective sees lacking material resources and the ubiquity of 
implementation problems as major challenges to compliance. Reflexive communications 
among the authors and the addresses of a rule and the provision of adequate material 
support for addressees is seen as the solution (cf. Chayes/Chayes 1995). Law is here 
considered as a process of permanent interactive adjudication based on legal reasoning 
(Joerges 2000). The focus of this perspective is thus primarily on the second dimension of 
compliance, that is, the way in which charges of non-compliance are dealt with after they 
have been put forward.  
 
Although a lack of material resources does not help to explain the variance in our cases, it is 
not rejected either. The countries that we studied in our cases are usually considered as 
exceptionally rich in terms of financial, technological and administrative capacities, and a lack 
of resources is rarely a problem. Nor do the addressees of the regulations in question have 
resource problems. Moreover, it seems that shortages of resources are only relevant with 
respect to certain regulations. Only "positive" regulations require governments to undertake 
something rather than to refrain from doing something (negative regulations), and it is only 
when governments are expected to act that the problem of lacking resources is of 
significance. Refraining from doing something does not usually require huge resources (see 
Zürn 1998: chap. 6). When states are required to refrain from doing something, as in the 
case of subsidy controls, resources are no significant problem, whereas ambiguity and 
cheating gain in relative importance as causes of non-compliance. In these cases, 
juridification and even internalization are the means chosen to bolster compliance. Therefore, 
when states with highly developed market economies and well-functioning administrations 
agree to refrain from doing something, we do not expect compliance problems due to a lack 
of resources. 
 
The second aspect of the management approach, the degree to which the application of 
rules is conducted by means of reflexive interaction, seems to be much more important for 
understanding the compliance records in at least two of our comparisons. Both in the 
foodstuffs and in the redistributive cases, deficient compliance was not the least motivated by 
the addressees perception that they had no fair chance to feed their concerns back into the 
adaptation of rules to changing needs. The effort by the German net-payers to the federal 
equalization scheme to adapt the redistributive mechanism towards a stronger emphasis on 
efficiency and fairness concerns was blocked by a majority of Länder (which, however, 
encompassed only a minority of the population) and left little option for deliberative 
reflections on the adequacy of the mechanism. Likewise, in the two foodstuffs cases, 
decisions were dominated by strategic voting (in the Codex Alimentarius Commission which 
decided for the WTO on the safety of growth hormones) or the bureaucratic rationality of the 
Commission and did not foresee any option to integrate either the concerns of important 
addressees or domestic affected parties. To be sure, the case of subsidy controls also 
underlines that reflexivity may impact negatively on the effectiveness of a rule to realize 
previously consented goals. However, this does not contradict the general argument of an 
important role of reflexivity in eliciting compliance: it might well be the case that the option to 
reinterpret rules when faced with new demands is an important element for the readiness of 
addressees to comply. Against this background, reflexivity can serve to some extent as a 
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buffer, balancing out the lack of social acceptance, adapting a rule to changing social 
preferences. This is a third interactive effect among our independent variables: reflexivity can 
substitute legitimacy to some extent. To be sure, reflexivity comes at a price, it may lead to a 
watering down of requirements for the sake of compliance, without improving effectiveness.  
 
 
3.2 Theoretical Implications 
 
These empirical results are relevant for a number of theoretical debates. They contribute to 
the general theory of compliance and implementation. Furthermore, they emphasize the 
importance of institutional design and of re-introduce the concept of legitmacy to the 
empirical study of politics beyond the nation-state. 
 
First, our findings support well-established results of research inquiring into the conditions of 
implementation and compliance. Accordingly, a multi-causal research design is required to 
understand the conditions of implementation, because compliance can hardly ever be 
attributed to a single factor (cf. Mayntz 1980: 15). The diversity of possible factors of 
influence on the national, the transnational and the international level means that the reasons 
for a high degree of governmental compliance cannot be limited to any one of the three 
levels, but requires a broad analysis with a variety of explanatory variables. Each of the three 
levels can potentially prevent effective politics: At the international level, a high degree of 
juridification is necessary to ensure the settlement of interpretational differences on the 
application of legal obligations and provide international institutions with the means to 
enforce legal obligations. At the transnational level, the integration of public interest groups is 
required to enable domestic concerns to be effectively voiced in the process of post-national 
governance. This participation is crucial in order to relieve the tension between domestic and 
intergovernmental rationalities and to generate social acceptance for international 
regulations. Therefore, what counts in the process of shaping post-national governance is 
the search for a complex set of procedures which can bring about a continuous discursive 
process among international organisations, governmental addressees and affected domestic 
parties on collectively acceptable regulations and the modalities of their application. 
 
Our results furthermore point to a far-reaching transformation of sovereignty in the EU. 
Sovereignty in the EU can no longer be perceived as a combination of the internal, legitimate 
monopoly on the exercise of power and the external freedom from legal constraints but must 
be understood as the freedom to engage in collective problem-solving (cf. Chayes/Chayes 
1995: 123). This "new sovereignty" is based on obtaining the status of a trustworthy member 
of the international community and relies on at least four elements. First, the EU incorporates 
non-compliant member governments into a dense network of discussions and negotiations, 
avoids to affront it and, thus, gives it no chance to invoke the "sovereignty argument", since it 
would be the non-compliant government itself which would exclude itself from this network. 
Second, this dense network of discussions and negotiations not only clears the route for a 
common solution but it also defines all the necessary details to reach this solution effectively 
denying the non-compliant government any easy exit option but also offering it concessions 
and support. Third, this network of discussions and negotiations established over years 
inaugurated a specific common logic of appropriateness, a specific problem-solving 
rationality, which functions as a yardstick for the earlier promises the member governments 
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have to live up to. Fourth, the EU nevertheless uses domestic pressure to secure compliant 
behaviour of the member governments. This pressure, however, is canalised into specific 
administrative and judicial procedures, thus strengthening the adherence to European 
policies without invoking national, sovereign sentiments. It is this set of non-hierarchical, non-
coercive instruments which made the European Union so successful in overcoming national 
barriers and in achieving a comparatively high degree of compliance.  
 
The third theoretically relevant result is that concerns about a widening gap between national 
democratic discourses and international policy making cannot be empirically substantiated by 
this study. It is true, governments are able to utilise the international level to promote national 
political projects, as is particularly evident in European subsidizing policies. But it is also true 
that a democratic government's actions will always remain linked to national public 
discourses and that it is hardly possible to implement international regulations in the face of 
explicit public protest. Just like national governance, international governance also requires a 
high degree of acceptance, not only on the part of its governmental addressees, but also on 
the part of those affected by the regulation. International regulations which cannot be 
sufficiently legitimized on the national level stand little chance of being implemented if they 
meet with broad public opposition. Against this background, concerns about the emergence 
of New Raison d’Etat (Wolf 2000) seem highly exaggerated. What stands in fundamental 
contrast to the decoupling of international politics and national democracy is the necessity for 
public justification and the dependence of democratic politics on broad public consent. 
 
 
 
4. Implications for the Study of European Integration 
 
 
What is special about the EU? What are the key institutions of the European polity, what 
logic do they follow and how is legitimacy generated for this system? What is the driving 
force of European integration? What are the main features of the mechanisms by which 
decisions are made in this system? These are some of the key questions with which the 
study of European integration has dealt. Our study has implications for at least two of the 
most contested issues relating to European integration. 
 
 
4.1 What Kind of Polity is the EU? 
 
The EU is, above all, a political system that extensively utilizes law to create order and 
purpose. Law-making and law enforcement takes place within a structure that combines 
hierarchical and horizontal procedures. Whereas a central body with superior resources is 
clearly absent, the system has developed a well established legal hierarchy and consented 
authority relations. The EU is an authoritative system that works without having to wield the 
threat of brute force. It does, however, utilize mechanisms of horizontal enforcement which 
depend in their effectiveness on the nationally established shadows of brute force. The EU 
therefore is by no means detached from sanctions and force. To understand the 
constitutional features of the EU, it may be useful to rethink the concept of hierarchy. When 
lawyers and political scientists talk of hierarchy, they easily compound two aspects of the 
concept which do not necessarily go together and therefore must be distinguished: although 
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the EU does neither have coercive material capacities nor the means to deal with ultra vires 
conflicts, it certainly does display a significant degree of legal hierarchy, now identified by 
many as a "constitutionalization of the treaty system." (Stone Sweet/Caporaso 1998: 102). 
The phrase captures the transformation of an intergovernmental organization governed by 
international law into a multi-tiered system of governance founded on higher-law 
constitutionalism. The EU can therefore be characterized as a political system that has 
developed hierarchical legal relations independent of a material hierarchy and the means to 
resolve ultra vires conflicts. It thus becomes evident that legal hierarchy on the one hand and 
superior force by means of material hierarchy on the other hand do not belong together by 
logical necessity.  
 
The Achilles heel of this system is not the absence of a superior force, but an insufficient 
degree of societal integration of all the member states. Political integration through law is 
clearly more advanced than societal integration, as indicated by a strong feeling of common 
identity and an existent public discourse. Even if a weak form of collective identity, in which 
people do have an interest in the well-being of the collectivity as a whole, existed, in the 
absence of a common political language and of an integrated mass media system it did not 
yet translate into an European public discourse about what is right or wrong for Europe. In 
this sense, law in the EU is deficient on one count especially. It does not sufficiently carry out 
the pivotal function of linking the normative framework of the social and political system on 
the one hand with the life-world conditions of the regulations’ addressees and other affected 
parties (Habermas 1992: 78). To the extent that law cannot fulfill this function, it is vulnerable 
to the legitimacy challenge.  
 
In the national setting, the law could serve its function as a transformer comparatively easy, 
because it could build on a historically established common language, a common media 
system and a dense system of associations which supported the exchange of positions, 
views and opinions. In the EU at least the first two of these social prerequisites are missing, 
and there is little evidence that this will change significantly in the near future. The challenge 
of the EU therefore is to embark on a historically new endeavor of promoting social 
integration, mediating between fragmented publics and realizing discursive interaction across 
boundaries without having the option to repeat the national experience. Its resources to do 
so are far from overwhelming. There is little reason, however, to be too skeptical either. On 
the one hand, it needs to be pointed out that broad public discourses in the national setting 
did likewise not precede the setting up of authoritative institutions but were a subsequent 
phenomenon which followed their establishment. Accordingly it has been argued that the 
ethical-political self-consciousness of citizens is not a constant but changes over time. 
Community-building in the national setting was not the product of a primordial “we-feeling” 
but only emerged as the product of a legal institutionalization of civil communication 
(Habermas 1997: 191). Therefore, it is not only possible but also probable that the building 
up of European institutions may trigger in the long run a similar effect of raising 
consciousness for cross-border affairs and may lead to the establishment of a true European 
public. Already today we can observe transnational sectoral and issue-specific publics which 
encompass not only governmental actors but also large parts of civil society, including 
interactive cross-border media coverage and a reflexive discourse among different national 
publics (Abromeit/Schmidt 1998, Eder/Kantner 2000, Schmalz-Bruns 1999).  
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These observations are compatible with an understanding of the EU as a multi-level 
governance system (cf. Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996, Marks et al. 1996, Jachtenfuchs 
2001). Multi-level governance conceives the EC as a unique political system that is 
constituted by both nation-states and European institutions, each of them defined in relation 
to the other. Moreover, the nation-states are so deeply enmeshed in the system of multi-level 
governance that they can no longer be thought of as distinct political systems. This feature 
makes the EC a political system. Unlike many national political systems, the principal 
members of the EU multi-level-governance polity are not individual citizens but corporate 
actors working within highly organized and specialized subsystems (cf. Kohler-Koch 1999). 
States can – from this perspective – be seen as territorially defined interest organizations, 
functionally segmented and existing side by side with functionally defined interest 
organizations. Furthermore, the participation of the members is primarily motivated by an 
interest in problem-solving rather than a common identity. Members share the notion of 
upgrading the common interest rather than pursuing the common good. Third, the central 
authority typical to the national setting is substituted in the multi-level polity by a decision-
mode which more closely approximates unanimity than majority rule. Precedence is thus 
given to bargaining and deliberation over public discourse and majority voting as a decision-
making mechanism (Eriksen/Fossum 2000: Fn. 7) as well as an enforcement mechanism 
that is horizontalized and builds on legal internalization as a substitute for a legitimate 
monopoly of force.  
 
While these constitutional principles are admirably successful in many respects, the still 
prevalent fencing-off of the people at the European level permanently harbors the danger of 
public protest at the national level. The lesson therefore is the same as in any national 
setting: If people are excluded from decisions, they will show on average a low readiness to 
accept their outcome. A necessary condition for the future integration of Europe therefore is 
not only to facilitate a clever institutional design which emphasizes monitoring, legalization 
and independent sanctioning, but also to bridge the still dominant divide between the EU’s 
political system and its citizens.  
 
 
4.2 What Drives Integration? 
 
Our findings also have implications for theories explaining the causes and forces behind 
European integration. Since the onset of European integration, there have been mainly two 
answers to the question. One answer, neofunctionalism, emphasizes the unintended spill-
over effects of early decisions in the development of the EU (Burley/Mattli 1993, Alter 2001, 
Stone Sweet/Caporaso 1998), while intergovernmentalism, the other answer, stresses the 
powers of member-state governments (Moravcsik 1998, Garrett 1992).  
 
Our findings contribute to this debate. On the one hand, the role of legalization in eliciting 
compliance is central. Legalization indeed leads member states to do things they did not 
initially want to do. By taking part in legalized interaction in the EU or even the WTO, 
member states become participants in transnational legal discourses which cover not only 
governments but encompass parliaments, Courts and even individuals. Member States 
become slowly socialized in an intensifying network of transnational legal reasoning and 
even may, as some point out, undergo a redefinition of their political identity. It is no longer 
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the sovereign nation-state which is today the dominant paradigm of intergovernmental 
relations in the EU but the legally bound member state (Walter 1999) which must regard its 
legal obligations and respects external restraints for the sake of its long-term interests. 
Legalization therefore is not merely a means to correctly implement and comply with rules 
that have been agreed upon by member states but a process which impacts on the very 
identity of democratic states. In this sense, legal functionalism is right. Legalization 
contributes independently of the government's preferences to the dynamics of European 
integration.  
 
On the other hand, however, the virtuous cycle can easily be broken. Compliance with 
European regulations is seriously put to the test if an issue comes on the agenda of a 
broader public discourse and different national public discourses on this issue are both 
fragmented in the sense that they do not relate to each other and polarized in the sense that 
they lead to completely different outcomes. Under these circumstances, national political 
systems have strong incentives to subordinate their long-term interest in a law-impregnated 
community to short-term domestic concerns and bring the functional dynamics of European 
integration to a halt. While these findings support the intergovernmental point of view to 
some extent, they also diverge from it. It is not the governments or dominant economic 
interests that orchestrate the national backlash against the virtuous cycle, but national public 
opinions. Issues of legitimacy and the still fragmented character of the public in Europe, 
rather than dominant economic interests endanger the system. Therefore, the most important 
source for the disruption of the virtuous cycle of legal integration and a disintegrative 
backlash may not necessarily be national governments or national high courts, but 
fragmented national publics. 
 
The transformation process taking place in Europe from an intergovernmental system to a 
postnational multi-level governance system can thus be divided into different stages (Zürn 
1999). The first stage can most plausibly be regarded as a more or less unintended, indirect 
outcome of deliberate political responses following (perceived) functional demands and 
national interests. The permanent deepening of some regulations so that they increasingly 
deal with positive interventions into the national societies and behind-the-border issues is 
part of this first stage. This creates the need for credible commitments to designing these 
more ambitious regulations and the development of supranational bodies to deal with 
collisions between different regulations. The second stage of the transformation is much 
more reflective. When society and political actors begin to comprehend the change, they 
begin to include issues of trans-boundary identity and trans-boundary ethics into their 
considerations. Pressures to improve the life conditions of people living thousands of miles 
away, as well as the debate on European identity and democracy are first signs of this 
reflective stage in the transformation process. Parallel to these developments, however, one 
can observe reactionary movements of a nationalist tendency and a growing awareness of 
the difficulties of designing democratic multi-level governance institutions. The outcome of 
this second stage of the transformation process has yet to be decided. 
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4.3 Political Implications 
 
Although looking into the future is a business political scientists are not educated in, it follows 
from our analysis that an important factor of influence for the outcome of the second stage of 
the EU’s integration will be its ability to establish an institutional design which goes beyond 
executive multilateralism and intergovernmental or even supranational legalism. In doing so, 
the EU (same as other international institutions) does not need to strive for full-blown 
hierarchy nor try to repeat the model of the nation-state. What is needed is a combination of 
the insights of rational institutionalism and legalism with a serious improvement of the social 
acceptance of the EU, mainly by increasing the participation of affected parties in the EU’s 
political process. There is no reason to be too sceptical about the prospects of such an 
undertaking. If viewed over time, both European and international institutions are clearly in a 
process of developing new mechanisms of institutionalized cooperation, legal integration and 
social participation. A major reason for this process may well be the fact that most cases of 
open non-compliance are perceived by the EU, but also by the WTO, as institutional crises 
which trigger the search for new institutional solutions. Against this background, the 
increasing legalization of European and international politics, the extension of participation 
rights of the European Parliament and the search for new forms of participation for non-
governmental actors in EU and WTO must also be understood as institutional learning 
processes which react to perceived deficits by attempting to eliminate them. Thus, economic 
and political globalisation may present a challenge to the institutional order of the national 
constellation, but it is at the same time a chance to meet this challenge constructively 
through a strategy of building up the institutional requisites of a working post-national political 
system. 
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